1901-1981
French psychoanalytical theorist who' s influence continues today most notably advocated by Slavoj Zizek.
Lacan in turn, reinterprets Freud and in particular, the difficult concept of the unconscious. Lacan links language and the unconscious and suggests that the unconscious is structured like a language. This resonates with some of Freud's ideas as articulated in Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious and his earlier work on The Interpretation of Dreams.
Lacan is also known for his theory of the Mirror Stage. This occurs in infants who at that stage develop a capacity that is evidenced by their reaction of recognition when they see their own image in a mirror. What is this capacity? It is a conceptual act, the establishment of 'I' (the ego) and an essential foundation for social functioning and a precursor to language. (Why do we use language? To communicate with others!)
Lacan proposes that reality for humans is comprised of a trilogy of levels the Real, Imaginary and Symbolic orders.
I see these as registers of the mind ways of knowing.
Zizek provides a useful analogy - consider the game of chess: at one level, corresponding to the Symbolic, we have the rules of the game, at another level we have the representation of the pieces as, for example, a knight or a pawn, this is the Imaginary and at the third level we have the actual game itself, all aspects of it, including the thinking of the players , the physical surroundings etc..
Language works at the level of the Symbolic and it is always influenced by the big Other.
Language is not a passive exchange - when we communicate we operate within a frame of reference (a concept from Mezirow in turn from Habbermas). Lacan reifies this as the big Other - he gives it a form that recognises how we think. For example, a religious person may process thoughts as what God would like me to say or do, or perhaps a person has a strong ideological framework as with communism - this will shape all that is uttered.
What then of the Real and the Imaginary?
The Real is usually recognised by an absence rather in the same way that we respond to a disequilibrium. We don't perceive it directly but rather through our responses.
So here's an example of my own making that gets at what I think Lacan was attempting to point to. I met a colleague recently and I said "Isn't it terrible what's been happening in Limerick yet another gangland murder yesterday"
He responded "Shocking when will it ever stop".
This is just a small part of a typical verbal exchange that takes place between people every day. Look at the levels or registers, or as Lacan would say 'orders' of the discourse.
There is the Symbolic order this comprises the words exchanged and our shared cultural understanding of, for example, what we mean when we say 'gangland' and further our shared collection of connotations for Limerick.
I would describe the Symbolic order as a form of literacy.
The next level is the Imaginary order. When I say "Isn't it terrible I am referring to a specific recent murder the most recent in a spate. I have a way of imagining a murder it's certainly a very sanitized format.
Let me call it a visualization but note that the perception may not all be visual in nature. This visualization for me is tame, very tame for a murder. I leave out a huge amount of detail - so my imagined form is constructed by me in a way that I can use it and not get too upset by it. Notice, that the Imaginary order is not a complete picture, such a picture would be unworkable in everyday life.
Now consider the Real order. This is everything that is not part of the Symbolic or the Imaginary. I call it the inconceivable. What's our way of knowing this? We indirectly detect by imbalance or absence-as in when we use the phrase 'the breakdown of law and order'. There's lots left out - the fragility of life, the sociological crisis in areas of Limerick, injustices, capacity for evil.
This is as far as I will go for now with Lacan.
There is a link to a good web site on Lacan above.
Monday, April 7, 2008
Jung
Some notes Carl Jung and Motivation
Jung and others emphasise the unconscious.
The suggestion is that we need to question the contribution of the unconscious to motivation. Jung uses the terms psyche and psychic rather than mind and mental.
Jung sees the unconscious aspect of the psyche as different but complimentary to the conscious. Jung sees the psyche as a dynamic system, in constant flux and self-regulating . He calls the psychic energy libido acting out a form of opposition and compensation. Forward (progression) and backward (regression) movement of the libido -think of adaptation (to one's environment) and accommodation (change in mind). Some idea of flow between the conscious and the unconscious. And by the way regression (which often gets a bad press) is not a bad thing.
Jung also talks about symbols and signs. A sign as a substitute or representation of a real thing while a symbol is a wider representation.
The conscious aspect of the psyche may be compared with an island jutting out of the sea. The island could be seen as the ego the bit above the water. Now there's lots of stuff that we either forget, have repressed or suppressed; all of these occupy the personal unconscious. The island metaphor places the personal unconscious as just beneath the surface theoretically recoverable.
What lies deeper still is the collective unconscious.
The tendency to experience the world in a manner shaped by the collective past history of mankind is what Jung called archetypal and archetypes are a form of human blueprint for intuition.
A complex is a type of grouping of ideas around a basic nucleus.
There are dispositional and environmental contributors to complexes. Complexes can arise in the conscious and unconscious. Unconscious complexes can appear to act or drive independently of the ego.
So what is the drive through life -the propulsion?
Jung found the answer to this question gradually evolved itself during years of work with patients, and borrowed the word 'individuation' to describe it. There were, he found, a relatively large number of people who, while cured in the ordinary sense of the word, either persisted in continuing their analytical treatment, which he defined as 'the dialectical discussion between the conscious mind and the unconscious', people were seeking a goal, something like a quest for wholeness.
Conscious and unconscious do not make a whole when one of them is suppressed and injured by the other. If they must contend, let it at least be a fair fight with equal rights on both sides. Both are aspects of life. Consciousness should defend its reason and protect itself, and the chaotic life of the unconscious should be given the chance of having its way too -- as much of it as we can stand. This means open conflict and open collaboration at once. That, evidently, is the way human life should be. It is the old game of hammer and anvil: between them the patient iron is forged into an indestructible whole, an 'individual'. This, roughly, is what I mean by the individuation process. 15
15. 'Conscious, Unconscious, and Individuation' (C.W., 9, i), pars. 522-3
Jung and others emphasise the unconscious.
The suggestion is that we need to question the contribution of the unconscious to motivation. Jung uses the terms psyche and psychic rather than mind and mental.
Jung sees the unconscious aspect of the psyche as different but complimentary to the conscious. Jung sees the psyche as a dynamic system, in constant flux and self-regulating . He calls the psychic energy libido acting out a form of opposition and compensation. Forward (progression) and backward (regression) movement of the libido -think of adaptation (to one's environment) and accommodation (change in mind). Some idea of flow between the conscious and the unconscious. And by the way regression (which often gets a bad press) is not a bad thing.
Jung also talks about symbols and signs. A sign as a substitute or representation of a real thing while a symbol is a wider representation.
The conscious aspect of the psyche may be compared with an island jutting out of the sea. The island could be seen as the ego the bit above the water. Now there's lots of stuff that we either forget, have repressed or suppressed; all of these occupy the personal unconscious. The island metaphor places the personal unconscious as just beneath the surface theoretically recoverable.
What lies deeper still is the collective unconscious.
The tendency to experience the world in a manner shaped by the collective past history of mankind is what Jung called archetypal and archetypes are a form of human blueprint for intuition.
A complex is a type of grouping of ideas around a basic nucleus.
There are dispositional and environmental contributors to complexes. Complexes can arise in the conscious and unconscious. Unconscious complexes can appear to act or drive independently of the ego.
So what is the drive through life -the propulsion?
Jung found the answer to this question gradually evolved itself during years of work with patients, and borrowed the word 'individuation' to describe it. There were, he found, a relatively large number of people who, while cured in the ordinary sense of the word, either persisted in continuing their analytical treatment, which he defined as 'the dialectical discussion between the conscious mind and the unconscious', people were seeking a goal, something like a quest for wholeness.
Conscious and unconscious do not make a whole when one of them is suppressed and injured by the other. If they must contend, let it at least be a fair fight with equal rights on both sides. Both are aspects of life. Consciousness should defend its reason and protect itself, and the chaotic life of the unconscious should be given the chance of having its way too -- as much of it as we can stand. This means open conflict and open collaboration at once. That, evidently, is the way human life should be. It is the old game of hammer and anvil: between them the patient iron is forged into an indestructible whole, an 'individual'. This, roughly, is what I mean by the individuation process. 15
15. 'Conscious, Unconscious, and Individuation' (C.W., 9, i), pars. 522-3
Sunday, April 6, 2008
The Question of Psychoanalysis
I face a challenge every time I engage with psychoanalytical theories and theorists. I'm never really sure as to the substance and value of the approach. I remain detached and skeptical and tend to apply a higher degree of critical appraisal. On the other hand I sense that there are some very important ideas in this field and that part of the challenge is the complex and intimate nature of what's being studied.
In this series of blogs I propose to review psychoanalytical thinkers and their theories and to work through their ideas to see what stacks up in. To begin with, I intend to look closely at three of the founding theorists Freud, Jung and Lacan and to provide an overview of their main ideas and work.
In this series of blogs I propose to review psychoanalytical thinkers and their theories and to work through their ideas to see what stacks up in. To begin with, I intend to look closely at three of the founding theorists Freud, Jung and Lacan and to provide an overview of their main ideas and work.
Sunday, January 20, 2008
No Country for old Men
Went to see No Country for Old Men http://www.nocountryforoldmen.com/ with J. Quite a good film typical Coen brothers. Lots of open country and murders. Yes murders!
But what of the plot. Well quite a story really and a puzzling ending. We talked about it afterwards always a sign of a good film.
What else can be done on a wet day.
What about the ending. I think it’s courageous for a box office type movie to take on such a creative ending.
The sherif Bell tries to sort out his world as he begins his retirement. Here is a section from the script:
The sherif Bell tries to sort out his world as he begins his retirement. Here is a section from the script:
LORETTA (CONT'D)... How'd you sleep?BELLI don't know. Had dreams.LORETTAWell you got time for 'em now.Anything interesting?BELLWell they always is to the partyconcerned.LORETTAEd Tom, I'll be polite.BELLOkay. Two of 'em. Both had myfather. It's peculiar. I'm oldernow'n he ever was by twenty years. Soin a sense he's the younger man.Anyway, first one I don't remember sowell but it was about meetin' him intown somewheres and he give me somemoney and I think I lost it. Thesecond one, it was like we was bothback in older times and I was onhorseback goin' through the mountainsof a night. Goin' through this pass in *the mountains. It was cold andsnowin', hard ridin'. Hard country.He rode past me and kept on goin'.Never said nothin' goin' by. He justrode on past and he had his blanketwrapped around him and his head down. *And when he rode past I seen he was *carryin' fire in a horn the way peopleused to do and I could see the hornfrom the light inside of it. Aboutthe color of the moon.And in the dream I knew that he wasgoin' on ahead and that he was fixin'to make a fire somewhere out there inall that dark and all that cold, and Iknew that whenever I got there hewould be there. And then I woke up. *Black
By the way although the book is by Cormac McCarthy the title is obviously a reference to the poem Sailing to Byzantium by WB Yeats.
That is no country for old men. The youngIn one another's arms, birds in the trees -Those dying generations - at their song,The salmon-falls, the mackerel-crowded seas,Fish, flesh, or fowl, commend all summer longWhatever is begotten, born, and dies.Caught in that sensual music all neglectMonuments of unageing intellect.An aged man is but a paltry thing,A tattered coat upon a stick, unlessSoul clap its hands and sing, and louder singFor every tatter in its mortal dress,Nor is there singing school but studyingMonuments of its own magnificence;And therefore I have sailed the seas and comeTo the holy city of Byzantium.O sages standing in God's holy fireAs in the gold mosaic of a wall,Come from the holy fire, perne in a gyre,And be the singing-masters of my soul.Consume my heart away; sick with desireAnd fastened to a dying animalIt knows not what it is; and gather meInto the artifice of eternity.Once out of nature I shall never takeMy bodily form from any natural thing,But such a form as Grecian goldsmiths makeOf hammered gold and gold enamellingTo keep a drowsy Emperor awake;Or set upon a golden bough to singTo lords and ladies of ByzantiumOf what is past, or passing, or to come.
-- William Butler Yeats
Monday, October 22, 2007
Adult Learning
Adults learn what they want to learn and what they perceive as useful to them;
Internalisation involves the construction of new meaning based on passed experience and new stimuli;
Learning can be understood as always involving cognitive, psychodynamic and societal/social aspects;
Communities of practice embody all three of these aspects and as such are powerful drivers for adult learning;
Engagement in critical discourse is a likely outcome of successful adult learning in the long-term the reverse is also true adult learning is the inevitable outcome of critical discourse.
Transformative learning can arise in adults where appropriate conditions exist for questioning assumptions, critical discourse, reflection and restructuring of perspectives.
Internalisation involves the construction of new meaning based on passed experience and new stimuli;
Learning can be understood as always involving cognitive, psychodynamic and societal/social aspects;
Communities of practice embody all three of these aspects and as such are powerful drivers for adult learning;
Engagement in critical discourse is a likely outcome of successful adult learning in the long-term the reverse is also true adult learning is the inevitable outcome of critical discourse.
Transformative learning can arise in adults where appropriate conditions exist for questioning assumptions, critical discourse, reflection and restructuring of perspectives.
Friday, May 4, 2007
Behaviourist and Cognitive Theories
Cognitive theories of learning have evolved from experimental psychology and find their roots in the study of behaviour. The early emphasis was on measuring responses to external stimuli and the so called behaviourist approach was the dominant paradigm up until the latter part of the last century. Much pioneering work in experimental learning psychology was based on observing results from animal and human experiments typically involving the quest to understand relationships between stimuli and observed responses (Hilgard & Bower, 1966; Mackintosh, 1997; Travers, 1967). These insights into learning focused only on external observable behaviour.
Early work
Early exponents of behaviourism such as John B Watson, Edward L Thorndike and B. F. Skinner have contributed much to our understanding of some of the basic characteristics of learning. They achieved this by focusing almost exclusively on the observable interaction between the learner and the external environment. Behaviourists limited their enquiry to what could be measured or recorded by experiment. They considered the internal workings of the mind to be beyond the bounds of observation and therefore disregarded it. This was later seen as a severe limitation. However, viewed in the context of the knowledge and technology available at the time it might also be seen as a very practical approach. In contrast, today’s cognitive theories are based on models of the internal processes of the brain and are usually referenced to advanced experimental and computer modelling techniques. Both behaviourist and cognitive approaches largely ignore the emotional and social dimensions of learning.
Task analysis
Some useful instructional principles derive from behaviourist approaches to learning. Let’s consider what these theories can contribute to the specific case of Peter. Suppose the challenge for Peter is one of learning a new task for example using a dictionary to find the meaning of a new word. Probably the major contribution of the behaviourist approach is the concept of task analysis (John R. Anderson, 2000: 383) -the instructional strategy of decomposing the task into constituent sub-tasks and categorising these. In this case the task of using the dictionary to find the meaning of a word would be decomposed into sub-tasks such as understanding alphabetical order and scanning the word lists to find the target word.
Specific Objectives
The notion of specifically identifying and naming learning objectives also originates in behaviourist theory (Leigh, 2004; Reiser, 2001). Tenant (2006) includes a useful discussion on the value and limitations of behavioural objectives in instructional approaches. He notes that objectives are frequently cited in terms of observable and measurable outcomes. This is a common practice in e-learning whereby specific objectives, including pre-requisite or enabling objectives, for each unit of instruction are stated at the outset. Tenant questions the validity of using such a structured approach to instruction. He provides an example of mastering the complex skill of playing the piano –in this case, for different people, learning can proceed in a multitude of different directions such as posture, finger position, notation, scale drill and so on. The key to mastery is how these skills come together to form an integrated whole and following sequentially arranged specific objectives will not ensure mastery as this happens at different times and in different ways for different learners. Instructional analysis such as tabled by Gagne (1977) is based on the assumption that learning outcomes can be deconstructed into specific types of objectives and that instructional strategies should be matched to the characteristics of the objectives. Later theoretical approaches became more concerned with recognising individual learner characteristics.
Problem Solving Approaches
Cognitive science has been supported by new experimental techniques the relevant area of inquiry has moved beyond observable behaviour to deal with the internal processes of thinking and learning. A key foundation was the work of Newell and Simon (cited in John R. Anderson, 2000; , 1972) who proposed a model of learning based on problem solving and drawing on the emerging fields of computer simulation and artificial intelligence. Newell and Simon’s learning paradigm was encapsulated in what they called the General Problem Solver or GPS. The process involved applying a means-end analysis to a given learning task in a sequence of logical steps. For example applied to the dictionary task above if Peter wants to find the meaning of a new word –this is the goal. Peter selects some action that reduces the difference between his present state and the goal –this action is described by Newell and Simon as the ‘operator’. In this case the operator is ‘look at word description in dictionary’ and if this can be applied then Peter applies it. If the operator cannot be applied, then the next step is make a new goal to enable the operator –in this case find the word in the dictionary -thus dealing with alphabetical order becomes the means to the primary goal. Newell and Simon’s approach is the foundation for what is often referred to as an information processing model of learning. From this several new theories of cognitive architecture emerged and the scientific study of mental processes has evolved.
ACT-R
An example of one such cognitive approach is Anderson’s adaptive control of thought –rational or ACT-R theory (John R. Anderson et al., 2004; John R. Anderson & Lebiere, 1998). ACT-R and its derivatives are examples of cognitive models they are attempts to describe the internal architectures of the mind and in this way contribute to an understanding of the learning process. ACT-R theory is based on a complex model of human thought and is often represented as a computer simulation. It is in fact a theory of cognition rather than a learning theory.
Declarative and Procedural Knowledge
An important underlying concept is the distinction between of two types of knowledge -declarative knowledge and procedural knowledge (John R. Anderson, 1982). Declarative knowledge is knowledge of factual information, for example Dublin is the capital city of Ireland. Declarative knowledge is also explicit in that a person is aware of what they know. Procedural knowledge is knowledge that may be displayed in behaviour but one is not conscious of it -it is implicit knowledge often connected with how to perform tasks. Procedural knowledge often specifies how to bring declarative knowledge to bear in problem solving. In using a dictionary Peter, like many people, may use declarative knowledge of alphabetical order –simply reciting the alphabet while flicking the pages until arriving at the relevant letter. Others, who regularly use sources that are arranged in alphabetical order, may have procedural knowledge –quite simply they know that P comes later than L and before R and they have no need to recite the alphabet. ACT-R describes declarative knowledge in terms of small primitive units called chunks and procedural knowledge in terms of rule-like units called productions. The cognitive model also includes goal structures similar to Newell and Simon’s goals and sub-goals.
Skill Acquisition
Anderson (1982) relates the transition from declarative to procedural knowledge with the development of a cognitive skill. He proposes three characteristic stages in the development of skills (John R. Anderson, 2000: 310). The first stage is the cognitive stage this is followed by the associative stage and the third stage is the autonomous stage. During the cognitive stage the learner often works from instructions and commonly represents the knowledge verbally –as above when Peter recites the letters of the alphabet. The associative stage indicates a transition from slow and deliberate use of knowledge to a more direct representation of what to do. The example that Anderson gives is learning to use a conventional gearbox for driving –at the associative stage verbalisation of the task is reduced or dropped completely and the actions remain deliberate. The third stage is the autonomous stage –at this stage the skill is increasingly automated and often a person even looses the ability to verbally describe the skill.
Relating ACT Theory to Learning
Anderson and Schunn (2000) discuss the implications of ACT-R learning theory for education. The model allows for the acquisition of declarative knowledge in two ways either in a passive or receptive mode. These are respectively encoding from the environment or storing as a result of mental computations. To go back to Peter’s task of finding the meaning of a new word; he could be told the meaning of the word directly by a person or through a dictionary, this is passive or receptive mode, or he could work it out through deduction and this would be active or constructive mode. Interestingly according to ACT-R theory there is no inherent difference in the memorability of the knowledge generated from the two types of acquisition.
Procedural knowledge is gained through the generation of production rules and enhanced through practice. As practice continues toward a particular skill there is a gradual and systematic improvement in performance that corresponds to a power law. This assertion is an outcome of the ACT-R model and experimental results.
What then are the implications of cognitive theories for Peter’s learning? Overall they describe the processes through which a person can acquire new skills. There are useful insights into the stages of skill development and the power law of improvement through practice. It would seem desirable that learners such as Peter are aware of, indeed well informed of, these insights should they choose to embark on a process to acquire a new set of skills.
Anderson, J. R. (1982). Acquisition of Cognitive Skill. Psychological Review, 89 (4), 369-406.
Anderson, J. R. (2000). Learning and memory : an integrated approach (2nd ed.). New York: Wiley.
Anderson, J. R., Bothell, D., Byrne, M. D., Douglass, S., Lebiere, C., & Qin, Y. (2004). An Integrated Theory of the Mind. Psychological Review 111 (4 ), 1036-1060
Anderson, J. R., & Lebiere, C. (1998). The atomic components of thought. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Anderson, J. R., & Schunn, C. D. (2000). Implications of the ACT-R learning theory: No magic bullets. Advances in instructional psychology: Educational design and cognitive science, 5, 1-34.
Gagné, R. M. (1977). The conditions of learning (3d ed.). New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Hilgard, E. R., & Bower, G. H. (1966). Theories of learning (3d ed.). New York,: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Leigh, D. (2004). A Brief History of Instructional Design, Performance Improvement Global Network-International Society for Performance Improvement ND (Vol. 20).
Mackintosh, N. J. (1997). Has the Wheel Turned Full Circle? Fifty Years of Learning Theory, 1946-1996. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A, 50, 879-898.
Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. (1972). Human problem solving. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.
Reiser, R. A. (2001). A History of Instructional Design and Technology: Part II: A History of Instructional Design. Educational Technology Research and Development, 49(2), 57-67.
Tennant, M. (2006). Psychology and adult learning (3rd. ed.). London ; New York: Routledge.
Travers, R. M. W. (1967). Essentials of learning; an overview for students of education (2d ed.). New York,: Macmillan.
Early work
Early exponents of behaviourism such as John B Watson, Edward L Thorndike and B. F. Skinner have contributed much to our understanding of some of the basic characteristics of learning. They achieved this by focusing almost exclusively on the observable interaction between the learner and the external environment. Behaviourists limited their enquiry to what could be measured or recorded by experiment. They considered the internal workings of the mind to be beyond the bounds of observation and therefore disregarded it. This was later seen as a severe limitation. However, viewed in the context of the knowledge and technology available at the time it might also be seen as a very practical approach. In contrast, today’s cognitive theories are based on models of the internal processes of the brain and are usually referenced to advanced experimental and computer modelling techniques. Both behaviourist and cognitive approaches largely ignore the emotional and social dimensions of learning.
Task analysis
Some useful instructional principles derive from behaviourist approaches to learning. Let’s consider what these theories can contribute to the specific case of Peter. Suppose the challenge for Peter is one of learning a new task for example using a dictionary to find the meaning of a new word. Probably the major contribution of the behaviourist approach is the concept of task analysis (John R. Anderson, 2000: 383) -the instructional strategy of decomposing the task into constituent sub-tasks and categorising these. In this case the task of using the dictionary to find the meaning of a word would be decomposed into sub-tasks such as understanding alphabetical order and scanning the word lists to find the target word.
Specific Objectives
The notion of specifically identifying and naming learning objectives also originates in behaviourist theory (Leigh, 2004; Reiser, 2001). Tenant (2006) includes a useful discussion on the value and limitations of behavioural objectives in instructional approaches. He notes that objectives are frequently cited in terms of observable and measurable outcomes. This is a common practice in e-learning whereby specific objectives, including pre-requisite or enabling objectives, for each unit of instruction are stated at the outset. Tenant questions the validity of using such a structured approach to instruction. He provides an example of mastering the complex skill of playing the piano –in this case, for different people, learning can proceed in a multitude of different directions such as posture, finger position, notation, scale drill and so on. The key to mastery is how these skills come together to form an integrated whole and following sequentially arranged specific objectives will not ensure mastery as this happens at different times and in different ways for different learners. Instructional analysis such as tabled by Gagne (1977) is based on the assumption that learning outcomes can be deconstructed into specific types of objectives and that instructional strategies should be matched to the characteristics of the objectives. Later theoretical approaches became more concerned with recognising individual learner characteristics.
Problem Solving Approaches
Cognitive science has been supported by new experimental techniques the relevant area of inquiry has moved beyond observable behaviour to deal with the internal processes of thinking and learning. A key foundation was the work of Newell and Simon (cited in John R. Anderson, 2000; , 1972) who proposed a model of learning based on problem solving and drawing on the emerging fields of computer simulation and artificial intelligence. Newell and Simon’s learning paradigm was encapsulated in what they called the General Problem Solver or GPS. The process involved applying a means-end analysis to a given learning task in a sequence of logical steps. For example applied to the dictionary task above if Peter wants to find the meaning of a new word –this is the goal. Peter selects some action that reduces the difference between his present state and the goal –this action is described by Newell and Simon as the ‘operator’. In this case the operator is ‘look at word description in dictionary’ and if this can be applied then Peter applies it. If the operator cannot be applied, then the next step is make a new goal to enable the operator –in this case find the word in the dictionary -thus dealing with alphabetical order becomes the means to the primary goal. Newell and Simon’s approach is the foundation for what is often referred to as an information processing model of learning. From this several new theories of cognitive architecture emerged and the scientific study of mental processes has evolved.
ACT-R
An example of one such cognitive approach is Anderson’s adaptive control of thought –rational or ACT-R theory (John R. Anderson et al., 2004; John R. Anderson & Lebiere, 1998). ACT-R and its derivatives are examples of cognitive models they are attempts to describe the internal architectures of the mind and in this way contribute to an understanding of the learning process. ACT-R theory is based on a complex model of human thought and is often represented as a computer simulation. It is in fact a theory of cognition rather than a learning theory.
Declarative and Procedural Knowledge
An important underlying concept is the distinction between of two types of knowledge -declarative knowledge and procedural knowledge (John R. Anderson, 1982). Declarative knowledge is knowledge of factual information, for example Dublin is the capital city of Ireland. Declarative knowledge is also explicit in that a person is aware of what they know. Procedural knowledge is knowledge that may be displayed in behaviour but one is not conscious of it -it is implicit knowledge often connected with how to perform tasks. Procedural knowledge often specifies how to bring declarative knowledge to bear in problem solving. In using a dictionary Peter, like many people, may use declarative knowledge of alphabetical order –simply reciting the alphabet while flicking the pages until arriving at the relevant letter. Others, who regularly use sources that are arranged in alphabetical order, may have procedural knowledge –quite simply they know that P comes later than L and before R and they have no need to recite the alphabet. ACT-R describes declarative knowledge in terms of small primitive units called chunks and procedural knowledge in terms of rule-like units called productions. The cognitive model also includes goal structures similar to Newell and Simon’s goals and sub-goals.
Skill Acquisition
Anderson (1982) relates the transition from declarative to procedural knowledge with the development of a cognitive skill. He proposes three characteristic stages in the development of skills (John R. Anderson, 2000: 310). The first stage is the cognitive stage this is followed by the associative stage and the third stage is the autonomous stage. During the cognitive stage the learner often works from instructions and commonly represents the knowledge verbally –as above when Peter recites the letters of the alphabet. The associative stage indicates a transition from slow and deliberate use of knowledge to a more direct representation of what to do. The example that Anderson gives is learning to use a conventional gearbox for driving –at the associative stage verbalisation of the task is reduced or dropped completely and the actions remain deliberate. The third stage is the autonomous stage –at this stage the skill is increasingly automated and often a person even looses the ability to verbally describe the skill.
Relating ACT Theory to Learning
Anderson and Schunn (2000) discuss the implications of ACT-R learning theory for education. The model allows for the acquisition of declarative knowledge in two ways either in a passive or receptive mode. These are respectively encoding from the environment or storing as a result of mental computations. To go back to Peter’s task of finding the meaning of a new word; he could be told the meaning of the word directly by a person or through a dictionary, this is passive or receptive mode, or he could work it out through deduction and this would be active or constructive mode. Interestingly according to ACT-R theory there is no inherent difference in the memorability of the knowledge generated from the two types of acquisition.
Procedural knowledge is gained through the generation of production rules and enhanced through practice. As practice continues toward a particular skill there is a gradual and systematic improvement in performance that corresponds to a power law. This assertion is an outcome of the ACT-R model and experimental results.
What then are the implications of cognitive theories for Peter’s learning? Overall they describe the processes through which a person can acquire new skills. There are useful insights into the stages of skill development and the power law of improvement through practice. It would seem desirable that learners such as Peter are aware of, indeed well informed of, these insights should they choose to embark on a process to acquire a new set of skills.
Anderson, J. R. (1982). Acquisition of Cognitive Skill. Psychological Review, 89 (4), 369-406.
Anderson, J. R. (2000). Learning and memory : an integrated approach (2nd ed.). New York: Wiley.
Anderson, J. R., Bothell, D., Byrne, M. D., Douglass, S., Lebiere, C., & Qin, Y. (2004). An Integrated Theory of the Mind. Psychological Review 111 (4 ), 1036-1060
Anderson, J. R., & Lebiere, C. (1998). The atomic components of thought. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Anderson, J. R., & Schunn, C. D. (2000). Implications of the ACT-R learning theory: No magic bullets. Advances in instructional psychology: Educational design and cognitive science, 5, 1-34.
Gagné, R. M. (1977). The conditions of learning (3d ed.). New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Hilgard, E. R., & Bower, G. H. (1966). Theories of learning (3d ed.). New York,: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Leigh, D. (2004). A Brief History of Instructional Design, Performance Improvement Global Network-International Society for Performance Improvement ND (Vol. 20).
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